The Politics of Pilgrimage and Early Saudi Statehood
“I am pleased to inform your Excellency that the war in Hejaz has come to an end by the withdrawal of Shereef Ali from Jeddah and his abdication,” wrote the proud victor of the 1925 conquest of Hejaz to the acting consul of Jordan. After this self-congratulation, he triumphantly continues: “I have invited the leaders of Moslem Governments, parties and committees to a conference that will be held in this blessed land, for deciding the suitable conditions as regards the comfort and interests of pilgrims who come to this country.” Ibn Saud, founder of the modern Saudi state, knew only too well the responsibility held by the facilitator of the Islamic pilgrimage, or the Hajj. Upon finally ripping Mecca and Medina out of the clasp of his enemy, the Hashemite Sharif Hussein, Ibn Saud anxiously pondered the logistics of the mass pilgrimage. He knew very well what Muslim pilgrims would later learn: the Hajj would simply never be the same.
There cannot exist a more complete picture of the global scale of Islam than the annual Hajj. Performed by the Prophet Muhammad after conquering Mecca from the pagan Arabs, the Hajj became a mandatory act of worship for all Muslims, male and female. Its establishment as one of the five pillars of Islam rendered it a perfect arena for global encounters, as Muslims from Morocco to Malaysia came into confrontation with unfamiliar perspectives and lifestyles. Among the most peculiar of these encounters occurred with the establishment of the modern Saudi state, and the unprecedented rise to power of the Wahhabi ideology of the House of Saud. After all, the Hajj today takes place in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; only a hundred years ago, it did not. In his tumultuous journey as the facilitator of the Hajj, Ibn Saud had to pacify both his hardline Wahhabi followers and Muslim pilgrims of different beliefs, propelling the fringe ideology of Wahhabism into the global Islamic sphere.
Much of academia on the Hajj fails to focus on how Wahhabism as an ideology has impacted the experience of individual pilgrims, necessitating a deeper look at the historical implications held by the inception of Wahhabism. The ideology, named after its founder Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, originated in the 18th century Arabian Peninsula as a result of a pact between Abdul Wahhab and the House of Saud. Abdul Wahhab advocated for a greater puritanism in approaching Islamic theology against the backdrop of a dominant Sufi Islam; where Sufism incorporates swaths of mysticism and rituals ranging from dancing to saint veneration as means of worship, Wahhabism views these mystical rituals as innovations with no sound grounding in Islamic scripture. Ironically, though Wahhabism makes a claim to a greater Islamic orthodoxy, its appearance on the Arabian peninsula in a world dominated by Sufism marked it as a reformist effort by outlook. By allying with the increasingly powerful House of Saud, Abdul Wahhab hoped to see his teachings spread across the Arabian peninsula as a replacement to Ottoman Sufism. However, Wahhabism only ever made it to Mecca, the heartland of the Muslim world, through Ibn Saud’s conquest of the Hejaz in 1925.
Other historical works highlight the theological tensions between the Wahhabi government and pilgrims of other theological beliefs, yet they do not effectively communicate Ibn Saud’s role as a conciliatory figure. In an essay on “The Saudis as Managers of the Hajj,” author Saud al-Sarhan concludes that, ““Despite effective management on the part of the Saudis, ill feeling persists in some parts of the Muslim world: Saudi treatment of tombs and sites sacred to many Sunnis and Shi’ites remains a source of tension between Saudi Arabia and the countries it hosts for the Hajj.” This story comes close to the mark, but it fails to introduce the stakes involved in “effective management.” The rise of Wahhabism at the epicenter of the Muslim world did not simply imply Ibn Saud’s need to pacify Sunnis and Shi’ites of different theological orientation; it also spelled out his responsibility of quelling more hardline Najdi Wahhabis against the backdrop of an increasingly globalizing society.
The destruction of tombs and shrines in Mecca and Medina heralded the first of many shocks to Muslim pilgrims towards the Hajj in Ibn Saud’s Hejaz. Muslim pilgrims hoping to visit the graves of the Prophet’s companions were shocked as they witnessed the destruction of tombs and sacred sites at the hands of Mecca’s new rulers. These actions particularly shocked Shi’ite pilgrims, whose faith and theological structure completely depends on the Prophet’s family and thus would eagerly visit the graves of Syedna Hamza (the Prophet’s uncle) and Khadija (the Prophet’s wife). The British Report on the Hajj of 1926 contained very little on the emotions of the Hajjis, but when it came to the subject of these tomb destructions, the British spared none of the drama. The destructions were “a great blow” to the Hajjis, causing them “great heartburnings,” and when “an occasional lucky pilgrim would get in a surreptitious kiss or rub,” her would “become the envy of his fellows.” These reactions not only highlight the unpopularity of Wahhabism, but its relative obscurity at the onset of modern Saudi control.
Perhaps the most notable event to take place in the 1926 Hajj was the Mahmal incident, signifying important differences between Ibn Saud and his more hardline Wahhabi followers. Historically, the Mahmal arose as a celebration of the sovereigns of the Ottoman Empire, incorporating jewel and gold embroideries, and the cloth of the Kaaba. In Wahhabi circles, the Mahmal became one of the most opposed traditions of pre-Saudi Hajj, as it was deemed a heretical innovation. However, in spite of rumors that the Mahmal would be banned, Ibn Saud allowed the Mahmal to proceed, most likely to appease the Egyptian pilgrims. Though Ibn Saud showed restraint on the issue of the Mahmal, his attitude did not represent the attitude of his followers. The Saudi Ikhwan militia, upon whom Ibn Saud had relied in his military expedition of the gulf, taunted the Mahmal by throwing stones at it. As their transgressions became increasingly violent, the leader of the Mahmal caravan ordered his followers to open fire. The Mahmal incident resulted in 30 deaths before the “fortuitous arrival of Ibn Saud at the scene” prompted a ceasefire.
Though the Ikhwan militia did diverge from the will of Ibn Saud on the Mahmal occasion, his charismatic personality rendered him a beloved ruler who inspired obedience more often than not. Muhammad Asad, a European traveler who eventually converts to Islam and resides in the young Saudi state, writes extensively on his relationship with Ibn Saud, as well as Ibn Saud’s respectability among the bedouin tribes he ruled. Asad explains that the bedouins called Ibn Saud by his first name, simply Abdul-Aziz, due to his generosity “not so much a matter of the purse as of the heart.” He goes on to describe the King’s gravitas: “Perhaps more than anything else, it is his warmth of feeling that makes the people around him, not excepting myself, love him.” The Ikhwan obeyed the king not so much because they truly believed in the theological legitimacy of the Mahmal, but because they willingly loved and respected Ibn Saud’s authority. The British seemed particularly hung up in awe over how Ibn Saud managed to handle the Mahmal situation, as “the Arab bedouin, ever independent, obeyed him, despite the fact that twenty-five or more of their number lay dead before them and they outnumbered the Egyptians by thirty to one.”
However, it would be misleading to showcase the calamities of the 1926 Hajj without highlighting Ibn Saud’s effective management of the pilgrimage, through which the new government gained global Muslim pilgrims’ respect. In spite of the Mahmal Incident, the first ever Hajj within the Saudi state proceeded rather shockingly well. The report reads, “All pilgrims and visitors to the Hejaz since Ibn Saud has assumed control are loud in their praises of the perfect security of the roads to Mecca and the caravans… such a state of security seems never to have existed previously.” This “perfect security” resulted through Ibn Saud’s cooptation of bedouins who would otherwise raid caravans en route to the hajj. Other Hajj services seemed to have also been successfully administered for the most part, including food and water supplies for the pilgrims. For the young state of Saudi Arabia, which would not be officially declared until 1932, these successes are rather impressive. Ibn Saud could only have sincerely cared for the success of the Hajj to be able to administer services to over 55,000 pilgrims; though it would still be another 50 years before a King of Saudi Arabia would proclaim the title “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,” Ibn Saud knew too well that successfully administering the Hajj would increase the global respect of Muslims towards his regime.
Nevertheless, Ibn Saud’s delicate balance between pacifying his more hardline Wahhabi followers and compromising for Muslims of other theological identification would not last very long, as the Hajj of 1929 became marked by the Ikhwan revolt. The British identify the causation of the revolt as mismatching ideologies between the King and other tribal leaders: “Feisal Ed-Doweish, Ibn Bujad and other powerful leaders who did not see eye to eye with the King over matters of policy, and who interpreted the inauguration of new measures of reform on the part of the King as being radically opposed to their traditions and religion.” The charisma of the King did not hold out under the strain of key differences in strict ideological adherence, and the revolt lasted through until the Hajj of 1930. Considerably less pilgrims from the Hejaz attended due to financial strains caused by the revolt as well as dissidents boycotting the Hajj. This episode highlights the stakes involved in too much leniency on behalf of the King: despite his popularity, Ibn Saud risks alienating his Wahhabi base if he does not show a strong commitment to their principles.
The next year, the King attempted to compensate for a loss in his legitimacy by reasserting his strong commitment to Wahhabism. The British seem aware of Ibn Saud’s strategic maneuvering, “Ibn Saud, by his far-sighted political vision, has, however, succeeded at the critical stage of national life in ensuring the cooperation of the Najdi ‘Ulama… by standing guilty at their bar and imploring their pardon for past deviations.” Ibn Saud also called for a conference with leaders of Muslim countries on the topic of “Unity in the Brotherhood of Islam.” During the conference, one of the Egyptian attendees spoke praise of Moulana Shaukat Ali, an Indian political leader who worked for the British. This caused an outburst from Ibn Saud: “He criticized at length all those who believe that the salvation of the country lies in aping Western civilization.” Ibn Saud’s rather odd outburst showcases an attempt to distance himself from the British in the public sphere. By showing himself to be committed to a Wahhabi Muslim way of life against the backdrop of Western hegemony, Ibn Saud hoped to revitalize his regime legitimacy.
However, in his zealous response to the Ikhwan revolt, Ibn Saud further alienated Shiite pilgrims by reasserting Wahhabi precepts that deem Shiites to be inherent sinners. The British held onto six letters written by Shiite leaders expressing discontentment with the pilgrimage under Ibn Saud’s rule. These pilgrims seemed to complain the most about the rising rates of Hajj on the Shiite community; during the Hajj of 1931, the Saudi government put into place taxation measures on Shiite pilgrims on the grounds of “protection from other communities.” Syed Ishar Hussein, a former deputy magistrate in British-occupied India, wrote a particularly aggrieved complaint about these taxes: “...if this protection were necessary from our conduct or action, it could be justified. But if it is necessary from the bigotry and prejudice of the other community, then they should be taxed and not the Shiites.” Hussein went on to articulate his dissatisfaction with religious intolerance during the Hajj, highlighting how Wahhabi police repressed Shiites from completing their prayers in a manner satisfactory to the requirements of their sect. On this subject, Hussein writes:“If the Nejd government considers it a sin to be a Shia and taxes us, then it should give us the freedom of religion and prayer which is denied to us.” Though even Hussein seemed to praise the “perfect security” of the Hajj, the politics of excluding Shiite pilgrims from Ibn Saud’s services really began emerging from the threat to Ibn Saud’s legitimacy.
On the other hand, by the time Ibn Saud declared the official Saudi state in 1932, Sunni pilgrims seem to overall become more accepting of Wahhabism as a legitimate theological orientation. The “Religious Intolerance” sections in British Reports on the Hajj became gradually far less dramatic than the “great heartburnings” of the 1926 Hajj, with many pilgrims even accepting the impermissibility of visiting tombs and shrines. As early as 1929, the British noted that they “did not receive the usual number of complaints from the pilgrims of interference… in their religious observances.” By 1932, a new section titled “Religious Policy” replaced the “Religious Intolerance” section of the report, highlighting a clear shift in the complaints received from pilgrims. Though instances of intolerance still proliferated through the new “Religious Policy” section, particularly from Shiite communities, many Sunni Muslims began accepting Wahhabi reformist principles. For instance, some Sunni pilgrims even began accepting the Wahhabi claim of the Mahmal being an innovation, admitting to its absence from Quranic scripture.
The story of the Hajj in the early days of Ibn Saud’s rule is inevitably also a story of early state formation. In order to consolidate the legitimacy of his rule, Ibn Saud had to carefully balance out loyalties to hardline Wahhabi clerics and Ikhwan bedouin while presenting an image of himself as a global Islamic leader to arriving pilgrims. His rise to power and prestige as a leader of the bedouin and a facilitator of the Hajj led to one distinct consequence: a greater visibility of Wahhabism as a theological methodology. In fact, Wahhabism went from an ideology greatly shocking to mainstream Sunni Muslims to being ever-present in Mecca, where over two million Muslims migrate every year. Gone are the days of a meager 50,000 pilgrims taking an arduous journey via camel or boat to perform their religious rites. Today, the Hajj is the largest gathering of human beings on the planet, owing to revolutions in industry and transportation. While the Hajj continues to be a rather arresting amalgamation of global encounters, it has also become inseparable from the legacy of Ibn Saud. Not only is it impossible to perform the Hajj outside of the Saudi state, but it has become impossible to imagine a Hajj before Ibn Saud’s rocky climb to power.
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